Formation of civil identity in the context of Donbas reintegration tasks | Center for Political Analysis «Observatory of Democracy»

Formation of civil identity in the context of Donbas reintegration tasks

The search for ways and means of uncontrolled territories reintegration is currently one of the main public discourses. The authorities are drafting bills, non-governmental think tanks are looking for answers through research and public discussions. During the discussions not only questions of the return of Donbass are raised. The citizens also worry about how the inhabitants of Donbass will be perceived by those who defend Ukraine on different fronts – ATO participants and volunteers, those who were affected to varying degrees by the war. What can unite citizens placed on the different sides of the demarcation line? In a broader sense, this is the problem of establishing civil peace and forming a political nation: one of the key vectors of reintegration, which, obviously, should be defined at the legislative level.

The unformed common system of basic values ​​and the low level of civil identity throughout Ukrainian society have become factors in the strengthening of external aggression and its support from certain groups of the local population. So far, they remain active. And in uncontrolled territories, in connection with the intensification of the efforts of the “Russian world” to educate the representatives of “Donbas identity”, their action continues to amplify. As a result, due to the absence of the means to counteract and neutralize these factors, the consequences of reintegration may be opposite to the expected ones.

What is reintegration?

One of the first issues raised during public discussions is the question of what should be understood as reintegration. Indeed, the question is important. Wrong interpretations lead to the emergence of many problems. While calling an actual war an anti-terrorist operation, it is difficult to work out an action plan that is adequate to the situation. The Ukrainian explanatory dictionary interprets the meaning of the term “reintegration” as “the unification on new principles of what was formerly disunited”, as “the restoration in the citizenship of a state of persons who previously had it”. In the definition itself there is an emphasis on the fact that unification should occur on new principles. Therefore, in terms of reintegration as a state policy, it is obvious that such policy should be aimed at developing and implementing these new principles. Accordingly, the restoration of citizenship cannot be limited only by the principle of formal status returning. Citizenship, in addition to constitutional rights and duties, also presupposes the existence of values ​​on the basis of which a culture of citizenship is being formed. Thus, the reintegration strategy should include not only measures to return the occupied territories under the control of the Ukrainian authorities. Its key component should be the strategy of forming a civic identity and culture of citizenship both among the residents of the returned territories and all citizens of the state as a whole.

Civil component of the conflict: the causes and the search for solutions

During the independence period of Ukraine, a stable sense of belonging to a single community of state citizens was not formed within Ukrainian society. At the stage of the destruction of the Soviet Union, Soviet and Anti-Soviet identities dominated. The first, basically, was transformed into East- and South-regional identities with domination of the Soviet component. It is those elements that created a fertile ground for the “inculcation” of the “Russian world”. The second was transformed into West- and Central-regional identities. At the regional levels, a different attitude towards the state and its own civil status was formed. The specificity of identity in the Eastern and Southern regions is the stability and large influence of traditional “patterns”: citizens of the Southern and Eastern regions tend to identify the country more with power, gravitate toward a “strong hand”, prefer paternalism and collectivism. Its danger is that the following chain works: against the authorities – it means against Ukraine. That is why the slogans “against the Kiev junta” found support in the minds of many citizens. Citizens of the Central and Western regions, reversely, tend to maintain more modern values: they perceive Ukraine more as the land on which they were born. They believe that they are protecting the country, not power. Therefore, one of the key tasks of reintegration is the transformation of regional identities that are different in relation to the state, taking into account the specifics of the correlation between the elements of “tradition and modernity” in their structure, the formation of civil “we” among citizens of all regions.

The cause of the war is an external aggression. However, this war has an internal component. Any war alienates the conflicting parts, so after its end one of the first is the problem of reconciliation and the formation of a unitied civil society. The fact that the civil conflict is inspired from the outside does not mean that it will be resolved by itself, that the de-occupation of Donbas will automatically ensure overcoming that conflict. The civil component of the conflict should be considered in 3 dimensions:

  • At the level of the state. The difference of ideological, value and geopolitical orientations, a complex of problems of relations with Russia, still cause political differentiation among citizens of different regions. Moreover, certain political forces continue to play this card for their benefits.
  • At the level of the regions bordering the Russian Federation and territories bordering the front-line. It is worth remembering how events developed in 2014 in Kharkiv, Odesa, Zaporozhia. Even during the fourth year of the war, we cannot establish a radical change in the political orientations of all citizens of the border regions. Indeed, the “confused” – the part of citizens who before aggression had no reason to ask questions about their own identity but the war pushed them to make a choice in favor of Ukraine – are gradually changing. However, part of the pro-Russian and separatist sentiments did not significantly decrease. There was only a transition from an open to a hidden form. Conservation of such state of things is a form of delayed action. As a “vaccination against separatism” in these regions, it is necessary to introduce a system of universal civic education. The residents of bordering the front-line and liberated areas, obviously, certainly, experienced mood changes after the events. However, it remains an open question whether these changes relate to values and worldview, whether they contribute to the formation of civil identity.
  • At the level of the occupied territories. Obviously, here we have the biggest layer of problems. The sentiments “Viva Russia”, which provided the basis for aggression, are intensively cultivated in the informational environment and within the “educational policy” of the self-proclaimed “young republics”. Another key vector of the “humanitarian policy” is aggressive anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which is most aimed at children and young people. Even the fact that a significant number of occupied territories citizens are disappointed in Russia does not improve the situation, because they do not identify themselves with Ukraine either.

The presence of three levels of the problem requires its solution at these levels.

What disintegrates and can integrate Ukrainians?

Before the beginning of the war the most significant disintegrating factors were: attitudes towards geopolitical choice, towards an alliance with Russia and Belarus, towards NATO, differences in linguistic and cultural orientations. The events of the last 4 years have caused some adjustments. They can be traced on the basis of the results of a sociological survey conducted within the framework of the project “The Beginning of the National Dialogue in Ukraine” by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in January-June 2015. Most dividing factors for Ukrainians are the following: corruption of power (28.9%); the actions of oligarchs (28.8%); the actions of Russia, directed to the disintegration of Ukraine (25.3%); manipulation of information through the media (23.7%); the division of Ukrainians by the method of political agitation (19.7%). Thus, practically all the disconnecting factors, according to the respondents, come from power. Only 1.9% of respondents expressed the opinion that Ukraine has never been united and it is impossible to unite it. Respondents did not indicate the fact of war and the location of citizens on different sides of the demarcation line as the main or one of the main disconnecting factors.

The results of the nationwide survey “The Future of the Occupied Territories of Donbas: Possible Options”, conducted by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Centre in December 2016, can be considered as a confirmation of the non-aggressive and non-hostile attitude towards the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The majority of respondents consider citizens who stayed in the “LNR” and “DNR” as hostages: of family or material circumstances (31%), illegal armed formations (24%), the failed policy of the central Ukrainian authorities regarding the liberation of these territories (14.5%). The position “traitors deliberately switched to the side of the enemy” was named only by 6% of the respondents.

The factors most likely to unite the people of Ukraine, according to the sociological data received by the Razumkov Centre, are “the desire to substantially improve the welfare of all citizens of Ukraine”, “equal rights and coexistence within the boundaries of one state”. Priority of the first answer in the regional context is as follows: West – 38%; South – 34.9%; East – 38.1%; The center is 25.5%. As for the second answer – 19.3%; 33.2%; 33%; 26.1% respectively. The above-mentioned study of Democratic Initiatives Foundation, in turn, shows the dynamics of sentiment. On the question of what actions would be most effective for reconciliation of Ukrainians, the options for “victory in the war” and “real fight against corruption” were chosen by the largest number of respondents – 35.9% and 34.6%, respectively. 34% noted “improving the socio-economic situation in the country”, and 18.4% – “the rule of law”. Prosperity and equality of rights have remained the priority, but have fallen to lower levels in connection with the actualization of the need for security and the media-promotion of the problem of corruption. New is the fact that 16.2% of respondents noted “educational programs”. Therefore, the society not only begins to realize the need for political and civic knowledge. A significant part of Ukrainians see in education the main path to reconciliation.

A demand for a policy of civil reconciliation is forming in society. The results of the sociological research “The Beginning of the National Dialogue in Ukraine” of Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation show that 56.8% of respondents consider the implementation of state policy aimed at reconciliation of Ukrainians relevant. Is there such a state policy in Ukraine? What do citizens know about it? 24.1% of respondents indicated that they saw a TV program on this topic. 9,1% – heard about the round tables, discussions of the issue in their city or village. 6.8% – heard about the lessons, lectures in educational institutions on this topic. 55.4% do not know anything about it. Thus, society demonstrates a request for state policy, but does not see the intentions of the authorities to solve the problem and respond to the demand.

Based on the results of the above-mentioned studies, it is possible to make some conclusions:

  • Factors that separate Ukrainians have shifted from the geopolitical and cultural dimensions to the activities of the authorities (Post-Maidan, “democratic”). A dangerous trend is the unification which is based on the distrust to power.
  • The attitude of the majority of citizens to residents of occupied territories is tolerant in general.
  • To the main unifying factors, in addition to the traditional increase in welfare, citizens attributed values – the rule of law, equal rights.
  • There was a certain correlation between the number of citizens who pointed to the “rule of law” as a unifying factor and on educational programs as a way to reconciliation. Obviously, this is the evidence of the growing demand for the formation of the values of a civilized society and the understanding that the path to the introduction of these values, as well as to reconciliation, goes through education.
  • Despite the general low level of hostility towards the inhabitants of the occupied territories, most Ukrainians consider it necessary to have a state policy of reconciliation. This may be the result of an intuitive feeling or a conscious understanding that the process of reintegration will have a number of “pitfalls”, stumbling upon which, tolerance can give a big crack or even collapse.

“Pitfalls” of reintegration

The first problem, which is obvious today, is the absence for more than three years of state policy regarding the occupied territories. More than half of the citizens indicated their own non-acquaintance of what the state is doing or planning to do to end the war and reconcile the Ukrainians. Non-acquaintance and uncertainty always give rise to fear.

As the results of the already mentioned poll “The Future of the Occupied Territories of Donbas: Possible Options” conducted by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Centre in December 2016 show, none of the options discussed in the political discourse for resolving the conflict in the Donbas is clearly gaining priority in public opinion. In fact, in all the proposed compromises there are significant differences in the attitude of citizens, which is clearly traced in the regional context. Therefore, any decision can significantly increase tensions and confrontation within society.

Provided results of the research give an idea of ​​the attitude of citizens from the controlled territory to the inhabitants of the occupied territories region. The other side of the problem is the attitude of the inhabitants of the occupied territories to those on the other side of the demarcation line. Of course, here we cannot operate on the results of research because of the absence of ones. Indirect evidence of their relationship can be obtained on the basis of an analysis of the informational mix “Russian World – DNP/LNR”, personal impressions of internally displaced persons visiting from time to time uncontrolled territories. The main ingredients of this mix are identification with the “Russian world” or “Donbas identity” and “identification confusion”. Identification with Ukraine is to some extent present, but due to objective reasons it is impossible to determine its degree and scale today. However, the assumption of its weakening is logical because of the prolongation of the period of occupation.

Rather tolerant attitude towards the inhabitants of the occupied territories is largely due to sympathy for people who have become hostages of the war. Empathy is an emotional, but not a value, component. Emotions have the ability to change quickly under the influence of circumstances. First and foremost among these are the conditions on which the Russian Federation will agree to return the Donbas and which Ukraine will accept (obviously, it is not worth waiting for the favorable variant for Ukraine from the Russian side), as well as the question of who will pay for the restoration of Donbas (it is unlikely that Russia intends to do this, and international trials can last for decades). In this regard, warnings are already expressed. Considering the impoverishment of Ukrainians and the welfare issue being on the first place, the lack of support for any of the compromises discussed in the public discourse, it is not difficult to predict a radical change in emotions and sentiments in connection with economic issues. Sociologists do not include the question of citizens’ readiness to pay for the restoration of the Donbas in research yet. However, it is possible to obtain certain ideas about possible changes in sentiments, at least on the basis of reviewing feedback on the message that the occupied territories of the Donbas region owed for water 1.6 billion UAH. Thus, it becomes obvious that there is a need for efforts to transform the unstable emotional support of the reintegration society into a stable value, state-ideological one. This strategic component should be the basis of all state programs and laws.

The process of reintegration: a vision of power                                                      

The issue of the reintegration of Donbas actually “broke into” a political agenda in mid-June of this year. At the time, Petro Poroshenko announced the elaboration of a bill (an alternative to already registered by Oksana Syroyid and Mustafa Nayyem bills) aimed at ensuring the process of reunification with temporarily uncontrolled territories.

By an order № 8-р from 11.01.17 The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved a plan of measures aimed at the implementation of certain principles of state domestic policy in distinct districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where state bodies temporarily do not exercise their power. As can be seen from the content of the document, these principles concern strengthening the counteraction to corruption and shadow economic activity; development of the internal market; creation of favorable conditions for the development of entrepreneurship; avoidance of arrears in wages; ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens and improving the quality of social services; improvement of the system of providing administrative and social services; improvement of social protection of children, approval of a prosperous family; ensuring equal access to a quality education.

The tasks listed in the document reflect the current problems and determine the measures which are designed to contribute to their solution: improving procedures for passing through the demarcation line; organization of the functioning of humanitarian and logistics centers near checkpoints; providing citizens with social services, employment services in a controlled area, etc. There are envisaged measures for the protection of children in the war zone. As separate tasks, the promotion of creating a united cultural space in Ukraine and assistance in the implementation of “people’s diplomacy” are highlighted. Indeed, the tasks are important and the measures are necessary. However, the document does not look as a strategic one. It does not set the task of creating a civil space, a common system of values and humanitarian education of citizens.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine is involved in the implementation of the task of providing citizens from uncontrolled territories with free access to education at all levels and the development of programs and materials for distance learning. There is no mention in the document that students and graduates who experienced “humanitarian training” in the “best traditions” of Russian chauvinism need to have a thorough education. The necessity to study those disciplines that were not accurately taught in the self-proclaimed “republics” – the History of Ukraine, Ukrainian Language and Literature, etc is also not stated. In this way, educational tasks are minimized, whereas education as the main social institution should play one of the key roles.

In fact, the content of the events indicates that the formation of civil identity and the education of citizens in the spirit of basic values and principles of democracy does not refer to “some bases of state internal policy in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where state bodies temporarily do not exercise their power”. Without this, reintegration, in terms of the best outcome, will become a mechanical gluing of dissimilar parts for an indefinite period. In terms of the worst outcome, it will lead to devastating consequences.

On October 6, the Verkhovna Rada adopted in the first reading the project of Law of Ukraine “On the features of state policy on ensuring Ukraine’s state sovereignty over the occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions”. Article 4 of the law defines purposes of the state policy for restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine: the liberation of these territories and the restoration of the constitutional order to them; protection of rights, freedoms and legal interests of Ukrainian citizens who suffered because of Russian aggression; strengthening of independence, statehood, ensuring the unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Obviously, strengthening statehood and ensuring unity is impossible without creating a basis for this unity in the form of a system of basic values that are important for every member of society. To become important, values should not only be learned theoretically, but also should be transformed into the principles by which citizens are guided in everyday life. And this is the result of civic education. Evidently, the following articles of the bill should identify specific tasks in this area and the means for their implementation.

Article 5 of this project of Law refers to the use of available opportunities to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. Article 6 declares the restoration of humanitarian and cultural ties, providing access to Ukrainian media. Article 7 refers to measures to strengthen defense and security capabilities that must be carried out in accordance with the UN Charter and the security provisions set forth in the Minsk documents. Articles 9 and 10, which regulate the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and military formations, determine functions of guiding, planning, organizing and monitoring the fulfillment of tasks to ensure defense and security. Thus, only military, internationally legal, diplomatic and organizational means are defined. Is it possible to solve the tasks of strengthening statehood and ensuring unity only with the help of these means? Apparently not.

Politicians and journalists often use names “law on de-occupation” and “law on reintegration”. Both names do not correspond to the essence of the law. The content of the articles gives grounds for the conclusion that this law is mainly about reformatting the Anti-terrorist operation regime and restoring security. The law does not define the ways and mechanisms of deoccupation. We are not talking about directions and means of reintegration. Of course, the need to call a spade a spade appeared long time ago, and the law was late, at least, for three years. However, this is only the first step. The next law should be on de-occupation with a clear definition of its strategy. But the restoration of security and the transfer of territories under the Ukrainian control do not eliminate the key reason for domestic and local support for aggression – the dominance of the values of the “Russian world” at the level of certain regional communities. This is especially true for uncontrolled territories and to a large extent for bordering to front-line areas. Considering the informative, educational and “humanitarian” policy of the Russian Federation in the occupied territories, we can state an aggravation of the problem. The most vulnerable are consciousness of children and young people, since primary socialization occurs in an environment of aggressive separatism and the cultivation of hatred for everything Ukrainian. Therefore, the law on reintegration with the definition of legal, economic, humanitarian, educational vectors is the third necessary link.

We also should not hope that the value components of the consciousness of Southern and Eastern regions inhabitants have radically changed without the purposeful efforts of the state and educational institutions. Separatist sentiments have obtained a hidden form, and the Soviet-Russian system of values and landmarks remains decisive. Under certain conditions, the hidden, disguised and “sleeping” sentiments can again become explicit and active. This danger should not be ignored. Therefore, the law on reintegration should include points, the implementation of which will contribute to the spiritual and civil unification of residents of the liberated territories and the “big Ukraine”. First of all, it is a system of multilevel civic education, developed taking into account regional features of political and civic consciousness.

In addition, there is another component of the process that cannot be ignored. The bill adopted in the first reading has obvious advantages. It is the positive fact that on the fourth year of the war things are named by their own names, the mechanisms for protecting property rights are included and the responsible actors are identified. However, some statements have already caused protests of political forces representing various segments of the party spectrum. They took place in various forms – from blocking the tribune and fighting in the parliament to claims in media and street actions. But each of these political forces relies on more or less institutionalized support of certain social communities. Therefore, the aggravation of the political confrontation will necessarily lead to an increase in social tension and social distance within the controlled territory. Considering that in the process of reintegration it will be necessary to solve more complex tasks than just stating obvious things, it is necessary to prepare the space for a broad public and political dialogue. Any dialogue can be effective only if its participants share basic values ​​and principles. Thus, we again come to the problem of civic education as a mean of forming a system of vital values ​​and educating civil identity.

Conclusions

The map of Ukraine is politically multicolored. This is a normal and even positive phenomenon from civilization perspective. But only provided that the society is united by a system of basic values ​​and civil identity. In Ukraine civil identity has not become dominant yet. Regional identities have objective grounds both in the East and in the West. They are reinforced by external factors and ineffective state policy. This predetermines the need for a reintegration policy in a broad sense for the entire state.

Heterogeneity of society in identification features makes it necessary to form at least two basic components of a sufficient civil identity throughout the state: feeling of belonging to the community of citizens of the state (I am a citizen) and a sense of collective belonging and subjectness (we are citizens).

The problem of the formation of civil identity under the conditions of war has reached the maximum sharpness. Without rapid and effective steps by the government towards its solution, it is not possible to reintegrate uncontrolled territories, but also to preserve the integrity of the state in the near future. Identity of citizens, who are united not only by formal belonging to one state, but also by common social memory, by a system of values and meanings, is the foundation of statehood. The fundament of statehood will not be stable without it. We already have had a sad experience, it is time to draw conclusions.

Calling the draft Law of Ukraine “On the features of state policy on ensuring Ukraine’s state sovereignty over the occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions” the law on “de-occupation” or “reintegration”, politics and media introduces confusion in the citizens’ minds. Articles of the law do not reflect the essence and content of these processes.

The process of reintegration of the occupied territories must be the result of a social contract. The role of state power in the process of elaborating and implementing such a treaty is to form the values of civil identity at the level of the whole society; to develop the alternatives and to choose the acceptable compromises for society; to formulate a regulatory framework based on the above-mentioned components; to ensure the implementation of laws.

Recommendations

Self-awareness of citizens as members of the state is impossible without the existence of a system of basic values ​​in mind which are acceptable and important for all. Education of these values ​​is one of the tasks of political and civic education. Society and the state desperately need a long-term state policy aimed at the formation of the Ukrainian political nation. Education of civil identity is basic, but not the only vector of this policy. The task of the state is to create this strategy, taking advantage of, among other things, those developments that already exist in the public sector.

After the restoration of Ukraine’s state sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the next step should be their reintegration – a spiritual integration with the whole society on the basis of the political values system inherent to a civilized democratic country. Legislatively, this involves the development and adoption of a law on reintegration, which will determine the strategy for the formation of a civil identity for the entire state.

The reintegration strategy should determine the policy at three levels:

  • at the national level;
  • at the level of temporarily occupied territories;
  • at the level of the regions bordering the Russian Federation and territories bordering the front-line.

Priority should be given to the introduction of the value system on the basis of which residents of different regions will feel the spiritual unity and belonging to the common community of Ukrainian citizens in the mass consciousness. Normative acts adopted at the executive level must determine the specific ways and means of realizing this strategic goal.

For the temporarily occupied territories, a special large-scale program of civic education should be developed, which would include not only measures to overcome the consequences of “humanitarian education” in Donbas occupied territories and the education of democratic values, but also training specialists for its implementation.

It is also necessary to develop and adopt a law on civic education and upbringing, with subsequent amendments to the Laws “On Education” and “On Higher Education”. This law should reflect the educational component of reintegration at the three above-mentioned levels.

The question of transforming the consciousness of society is the same issue of national security as the army and defense. The situation requires that it should be decided not only in the parliament and the government. It is advisable to bring the issue to the NSDC for discussion and subsequent decision-making.

Svetlana Topalova, Elena Ukrainets

Center for Political Analysis “Observatory of Democracy”

Published on the informational and analytical portal “Hvylya”

The material was prepared within the framework of a project implemented with the financial support of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) and the Government of Canada