Amendments to the Electoral Code: how to keep “regional parties” out of local elections | Center for Political Analysis «Observatory of Democracy»

Amendments to the Electoral Code: how to keep “regional parties” out of local elections

The Electoral Code came into force two months ago, but its possible changes are already being actively discussed, including the conducting of the next local elections. In a new article from the Center for Political Analysis “Observatory of Democracy”, we analyze, perhaps, the most resonant of the initiatives voiced by the authorities – the so-called “amendment against regional parties”.

Law in the interests of the authorities

Most experts in January emphasized that the adopted version of the Electoral Code (and especially its Book IV on local elections), to put it mildly, is far from ideal. In addition to frank manipulations with “half-open lists”, which we clearly revealed in a separate study, there are many ambiguities and inconsistencies in the text.

For example, it is not clear why a record deposit was introduced for nomination to regional and large city councils, commensurate with a deposit in parliamentary and presidential elections, but in principle, there is no monetary deposit for participating in the elections of the “lower level” (cities up to 90 thousand, district, town, village councils). Also, the text of the Code leaves room for interpretation whether it is possible to run for council at different levels at the same time and whether a candidate for mayor can run for council. There is no definite answer whether the regional party organization can be the subject of the nomination of the candidates in cities of regional significance with a population of up to 90 thousand.

And the Central Election Commission itself recognizes that there are many such “white spots” that need a single official clarification. This is also why the CEC has developed its recommendations on amending the Electoral Code – however, for some reason, only that part of the amendments has been published that concerns the first three books of the Code.

Perhaps the CEC wants to wait for the final position of the party “Sluga Narodu” and “synchronize” their recommendations on local elections with the “party line”. And it should be noted that the pro-presidential force already had some common public position on this issue, voiced by party chairman Alexander Kornienko, faction head David Arahamia, and deputy Alexander Kachura.

Three amendments that were spoken out by the speakers of the “Sluga Narodu” are as follows:

(1) the money deposit in local elections is reduced by 9 times, replacing in the formula “4 minimum wages for every 10 thousand voters” the number “10 thousand” by “90 thousand” (the corresponding bill No. 2769 has already been registered in the Verkhovna Rada);

(2) a proportional representation system is introduced for cities and cities’ UTC, starting not from 90 thousand of the population, but 30 thousand;

(3) only those parties are allowed to participate in the local elections that nominate lists of candidates in at least 2/3 of the regional councils.

It is this third amendment, directed against the “regional parties of local elites”, that can have the greatest impact on the outcome of the elections and the nature of the party system. David Arahamia commented directly on the initiative: “We have adopted the Electoral Code, and many regional small parties may appear because of it. It is unbeneficial for us as a large party. Most likely, we will correct it”.

The cause-and-effect relationship here is somewhat broken – “many regional parties” are already existed, have actively shown themselves at the local elections of 2015 and are not connected with the adoption of the Electoral Code. But the head of the pro-presidential faction made it clear that the Law would be amended on the eve of the elections, based on the benefits for the party in power, so that the traditional logic of the electoral reform in Ukraine remains unchanged.

While there is no text of the bill, but only fragments of the interview, it is difficult to analyze this initiative. It is unclear whether it is a complete ban on participation for parties that do not submit lists to 2/3 of the regional councils, or whether they are being cut off from participating in elections at the regional level, but will be able to nominate candidates for mayors and deputies of councils of some settlements. It’s not a fact that the “Sluga Narodu” has already decided on the details, but the vector of changes is more or less clear, and here it is to weaken the positions of the “regional elites” and prevent them from participating in local elections with their “personal” party projects.

Marker of the 179th: fear of the “locals”

It is in the “regional elites” – the popular mayors, landowners and the eternal “owners” of their territories – that the “Sluga Narodu” sees the main competitors in the local elections. Back in the fall, Vladimir Zelenskyy expressed his determination to “reset” all regional political regimes and prepare on the ground alternative candidates to the current mayors who should “go for a victory” with the help of the Ze-Team brand.

The estimation on the repetition of the scenario of the majoritarian system of July-2019, when the “no names” from the “Sluga Narodu” only due to the strength of the brand defeated the repeatedly re-elected acting deputies, ceased to seem realistic in the winter. And the references to the data of sociological surveys, according to which the “Sluga Narodu” still outstripped all opponents by several times, and its rating balanced at around 40%, looked ridiculous in the context of local elections, primarily because the “universal” questionnaires of all-Ukrainian sociological services did not include “regional parties”.

To “try on” the results of such surveys with a “universal ballot” for the prospect of local elections – for the president’s team meant turning a blind eye to the real possibility of defeat. For example, in Kharkiv it was only necessary to conduct a sociological survey, supplementing the standard ballot with the nominal “Kernes Bloc”, “Svetlichnaya Party” and “Feldman Party”, as the prospects of the pro-presidential party no longer seemed so optimistic, and there was no talk of any 40%.

The reason for removing the “pink glasses” from the “greens” appeared due to the by-elections in the 179th constituency, where until recently the future governor Aleksei Kucher had smashed the current deputy and the head of the regional council with a result of 50 +%. Relying on the stability of the party’s rating (or rather, the lack of a powerful increase in the “old” forces present in parliament), the “servants of the people” ignored many other marker issues that sociology spoke about. But by spring 2020, the “honeymoon” of the pro-presidential party could not come to the end, which was reflected in the answers of the respondents to questions about confidence in the government, parliament, the right/ wrong course of development of the country, etc. etc.

And only the forced surrender of the Ze-Team in the 179th constituency under pressure from the ratings of self-nominated Yulia Svetlichnaya showed a real correlation of support for “local elites” and “new faces with a pro-presidential brand”. These nominally “parliamentary” elections were essentially the main rehearsal of local ones with all the traditional attributes of a local campaign and personality-oriented voting for recognizable authoritative candidates.

Even if an attempt is made to disrupt the election through “paralysis of commissions” on election day, this “technical defeat” has already become a signal to all “local elites” that the “greens” can be defeated. And for the “Sluga Narodu” this should serve as a shake-up and farewell to the illusions about the omnipotence of the brand and the 100% effect of identifying the candidate with the party.

Returning to the institutional dimension – the question for the pro-presidential force is now posed as follows: how to increase the role of party brands and not lose to thousands of such locally rated “nominal Svetlichnaya” throughout the country? The amendments on the transfer of cities from 30 to 90 thousand of the population to a proportional representation system, as well as on the prevention of “local” projects to the elections, are called upon to contribute to this.

Experience of the Election-2015

The Ze-team’s fear of the “regional elites” in the case of the 179th constituency is somewhat reminiscent of the decision of the “Narodnyi Front” not to go to the local elections of 2015. But these fears, of course, are not groundless, it is enough to turn to the experience of the same recent local elections to see the strength of “local projects”.

TOP-10 successful cases of “regional parties” * in the local elections-2015

Party Council Result
“Vіdrodzhennya” Kharkiv City Council 1st place, 57/84 seats
“Vіdrodzhennya” Kharkiv Regional Council 1st place, 50/120 seats
“Dovіryay dіlam” Odessa City Council 1st place, 27/64 seats
“Vinnytska Yevropeyska Strategiya” Vinnytsia City Council 1st place, 20/54 places
“Yedynyi Tcentr” Transcarpathian Regional Council 1st place, 19/64 places
“Za Konkretni Spravy” Khmelnitskyi Regional Council 1st place, 19/84 places
“Rіdne misto” Chernivtsi City Council 1st place, 10/42 seats
“Partiia Vilnyh Demokrativ” Cherkasy City Council 1st place, 8/42 seats
“Cherkashchany” Cherkasy Regional Council 2nd place, 16/84 places
“Sovist Ukrainy” Poltava City Council 3rd place, 7/42 seats

“Regional parties” in this case refer to non-parliamentary political forces that took part in local elections in 2015 in only one or several regions. And even under the Law “On Political Parties in Ukraine”:

  • in the definition of a “political party” its attribute is called a “nationwide development program” (Article 2);
  • it is said that all parties “are created and operate only with the all-Ukrainian status” (Article 3);
  • registration requires 10 thousand signatures collected in two-thirds of the districts of two-thirds of the regions, which already at the stage of creation emphasizes the all-Ukrainian nature of the association (Article 10);

=> however, in Ukraine there are de facto many “regional parties”, some of which directly emphasize this in their name (“Nash dim – Odesa” (“Our Home is Odesa”), “Cherkashchane” and so on).

In 2015, there were many successful cases of participation of “regional parties” in local elections – in half of the councils of regions and regional centers there are fractions of such “local projects” whose beneficiaries were representatives of “regional elites” (Balogi, Geregi, mayors of Kernes, Trukhanov, Mamay, and others).

If go deeply into the local councils of the Kharkiv region, then the “Volunteer Party of Ukraine” (the then beneficiary is Valeriy Dema) can be called a relatively successful example of a local project. In several councils, you can find factions of the exotic and not taking part in the elections of the regional council of the Party of Veterans of Afghanistan. An interesting case of a little-known party franchise happened in Izium, where the mayoral race winner Valeriy Marchenko ran for the “Novi oblychchia” party and got seats for a faction of the same name in the City Council.

In total, about 90 parties are represented in the local councils of Ukraine by at least one deputy, and here we can talk about the relationship between the electoral and party systems. The previous law of local elections obliged candidates to any city and district council to get at least some kind of party franchise, without allowing self-nomination. Hence, the demand for franchises with a “neutral name” is arisen, which are used locally (from one local council to participating in elections in several regions).

Now, by an amendment on the need to nominate in two-thirds of the regions, the “Sluga Narodu” probably expects to squeeze the party system to conditional 10-15 all-Ukrainian brands, of which the pro-presidential force would be the highest rated. However, have all the possible effects of such an initiative been calculated in the Ze-Team?

Risks for the “Sluga Narodu” and the dilemma of “local elites”

Suppose the changes announced by Arahamia and Kornienko are accepted and the “regional elites” have limited space for a maneuver. In this case, for example, the mayor of Kharkiv will not be able to go to the elections with the brand “Kernes Block – Successful Kharkiv”. But will the electoral distribution in the city change if the mayor leads his team to local councils with any other party franchise?

It is worth recalling that the mass voters in Kharkiv did not know about the Vidrodzhennya party until the summer of 2015 – for them, it was absolutely a “zero brand”, which, however, did not prevent the identification of Vidrodzhennya with Kernes to the maximum and gained in the elections a result sufficient for a one-party majority in the City Council.

In general, such an amendment leaves several options for the “regional elites” in local elections:

  1. To co-opt into the next pro-presidential force
  2. To choose the most popular parliamentary opposition party to the “green” party on its territory – probably the majority will focus on “Yevropeiska Solidarnist”, “Batkivschyna” and “Opozytsiina Platforma – Za Zhyttia”.
  3. Consolidate and create a common platform of “regional elites” with a universal party brand.

It is the third scenario that seems to be the most interesting. If the idea of ​​a “party of mayors”, voiced by Kernes at the last moment, was rejected in favor of the Opposition Bloc franchise in the parliamentary elections of 2019, the amendment against the “regional parties” may again actualize the idea of ​​such a “local government party”.

There is something to choose from – whether this alliance will be called “Doviriai Dilam”, “Nash Krai”, Ridne Misto is not so important. But if the “local elites”, who went to the elections with different “local projects” in 2015, agree on a single platform, this will be the main opponent for the “Sluga Narodu” in the upcoming elections.

Perhaps a single platform is an unlikely scenario, and there will be several such nationwide “local government parties” (targeting different oligarchs). But why does the “Sluga Narodu” independently contribute to the consolidation of the “regional elites” into a single / two-three party project? It is absolutely unclear.

There are two rational explanations that exclude a strategic error:

  1. Either the pro-presidential party is ready to openly cooperate with the “local elites”, and thus “drive” popular candidates to themselves.
  2. Either they are ready to cooperate secretly and create an auxiliary party project for those who cannot be publicly supported, but who will definitely win on their territory (such as “Nash Krai 2.0.”, similarly loyal to the new owners of Bankova).

In the first scenario, we will see the traditional model of the formation of a pro-presidential party, repeating the experience of the Party of Regions or the “Poroshenko Bloc”. On the one hand, it will be a complete break with the rhetoric of Vladimir Zelenskyy of the 2019 campaign model, an image hit not only to the president but also to the very idea that the clan-oligarchic system in Ukraine can be transformed into a polyarchic system. However, on the other hand, then the “Sluga Narodu” will win the local elections without any problems (in miniature this model was implemented in case of the elections in the three UTCs of the Kupyanskyi district on December 22, 2019).

In the second scenario, the illusion of a struggle between “strong business executives” and “new faces” will end with their coalition (public or shadow) in local councils. The union of administrative (prefects, courts, power blocs) and electoral (popular mayors and their factions in the councils) resources will be powerful, but short-lived, and the “local elites” will safely survive another president. Of course, these are very far-reaching predictions, but all the previous experience of cooperation between the presidents and the “locals” ended the same and in favor of the latter.

None of these two rational explanations refer to the previous readiness to really confront the “local elites” and try to reset the regional political regimes, because it is far from rational to promote the consolidation of their enemies. And when Arahamia speaks of the “amendment of 2/3” as a way of combating the “regional party parties” and the “local princes”, he either is cunning or does not understand what kind of “party leviathan of local self-government” he risks creating.

Summary

  1. A number of changes will most likely be made to the Electoral Code before the local elections in 2020. Moreover, along with the “technical changes” that bring the text in line with the new administrative and territorial structure after the reform is completed, some substantial changes can be expected. The logic of these “substantive adjustments” shortly before the election remains unchanged – to maximize the expected benefits for the party in power. From the “Sluga Narodu” voiced by top speakers, it can be concluded that a radical restructuring of the two electoral systems included in the Code should not be expected, but the pro-presidential force intends to introduce at least two significant amendments. First, to lower the threshold for introducing a proportional representation system to cities with a population of 30 thousand (and not 90, as in the current Law), thereby strengthening the role of the party brand and reducing the risk of repeating the majoritarian electoral scenario in the 179th constituency. Secondly, the party in power intends to limit the number of these party brands participating in local elections, having prescribed in the Law as a mandatory condition for permitting the party to nominate lists in at least 2/3 of the regional councils of Ukraine.
  1. In general, in conditions of decentralization, the support of local authorities has grown, and not even surveys about trust in certain institutions, but the outcome of the elections in the 179th constituency are a characteristic marker. And if in the “Sluga Narodu” they rightly see precisely the “local elites” as the main competitors in the coming elections, then it is not clear how the “amendment against regional parties” will help the pro-presidential force. Instead of a couple of dozens of fragmented “personal party projects”, one or more strong parties of consolidated “local elites” may appear. Part of the “locals” can strengthen the team of “Yevropeiska Solidarnist” in Western Ukraine or “Opozytsiina Platforma – Za Zhyttia” in the South-East. But such an amendment will be beneficial to the “Sluga Narodu” only if it is already decided to openly or “behind the scenes” cooperate with the current local authorities, “driving” them into a pro-presidential party or a specially created satellite project like “Nash Krai”.
  1. Guided by their own interests, the pro-presidential team, however, can significantly change the party system of the state. The trend towards a reduction in the number of parties (of which there are now more than 350), on the one hand, will improve the party system, saving it from “coma projects”, which in essence are not parties. However, on the other hand, the requirement for parties to nominate lists to regional councils throughout the country, together with extremely high monetary deposits and the legal impossibility of self-nominating at a city level of 30 thousand or more, can be interpreted as contrary to the “European Charter of Local Self-Government” and restricting the constitutional rights of citizens of Ukraine. For example, parties of ethnic minorities will feel the obviously discriminatory nature of such innovations. Why does the conditional “Party of Hungarians of Ukraine”, repeatedly re-elected to the Transcarpathian Regional Council, not to mention the lower-level councils (for example, in Beregovo), de facto lose the right to participate in the elections? And what consequences will it lead to – the peaceful inclusion of ethnic minorities in all-Ukrainian parties, or will it become a catalyst for separatist sentiments in the border regions, fueled by neighboring states? The president’s office should carefully analyze the potential risks from such changes, because at the moment the decision looks irrational and such that in the short term it will only harm both the “Sluga narodu” and the state.
  1. Given these risks, as well as the trends of Ukrainian decentralization and pan-European regionalization, one should probably not fight against the legitimate desire of “local elites” to participate in elections autonomously from parliamentary parties, but give them this right by distinguishing between two types of parties in the Ukrainian law – national and regional. The latter will be able to independently participate in local elections in their territories, and in the parliamentary elections in any way provide support to one or another nationwide party.

Anton Avksentiev, Ph.D. in Political Science,

Center for Political Analysis «Observatory of Democracy».

Published on the informational and analytical portal “Hvylya”.

The paper was prepared under the project «Promoting Democratic Elections in Eastern Ukraine», with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The content of the publication does not necessarily reflect the views of the NED and is the sole responsibility of the Center for Political Analysis “Observatory of Democracy”.